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A B S T R A C T
In this paper, we argue for a multiscalar focus on the governance of energy policy and practice. This perspective
reveals the translation of agendas and policies across scales stretching from the global to the local. We analyse
South Africa’s energy landscape, which is influenced by: a highly complex and dynamic set of generation and
production networks, policy strategies, multiple state and non-state actors, and the continuing impact of
apartheid. In the paper, we establish a dialogue between Actor-Network Theory and studies of socio-technical
transitions to analyse the translation and purification of discourses and practices across scales, and to consider
how these processes may impact on spatialised processes of energy transition.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we argue that the governance of energy policy and
practice needs to be viewed in a multiscalar context. This perspective
reveals the ways in which differing priorities and agendas are com-
municated, changed and sometimes obstructed or subverted [1], in-
fluenced not only by the scale at which they are generated, but by the
interaction between scales and between different actors operating at
specific scales or across scales. We focus on the case of South Africa’s
(SA) energy landscape, which is shaped by a highly complex set of
generation and production networks, as well as policy initiatives, state
and other actors, and the apartheid legacy [2]. Within the country’s
energy landscape, our research centres on the electricity supply to
households in informal settlements: an important (but often over-
looked) energy geography. Our analysis is informed by a combination
of two related theoretical approaches: Actor-Network Theory (ANT)
and studies of socio-technical transitions. The former enables the paper
to analyse how discourses and practices related to energy are dynami-
cally translated and purified between different scales and by different
actors. Understanding how processes of translation operate then pro-
vides an entry point for discussing the pathways and potential obstacles
to the politics of transition [3,4], as well as linking these pathways to
spatial processes of transition [5].
The analysis presented below is predicated on an understanding of
energy transition and policymaking processes as multiscalar [6,7]. We
argue that it is key to consider how energy policy is articulated at
various scales, including global, national, municipal, community and
household. In the SA context, this perspective is fundamental to how
local contexts and needs interface with national concerns and man-
dates, as well as with global issues such as climate change. At the same
time, we recognise that multiscalar interactions in governance are
shaped by a shifting landscape of actor-networks, from global policy-
making arenas to national government and electricity distribution ac-
tors, to individual energy producer-consumers (prosumers), and in-
cluding actors who are excluded or defect from the formal grid [8].
Here, therefore, our analysis is segmented by geographical scale and
time. Our aim is to thereby show how discourses around energy are
negotiated and performed at several scales, while not reifying scale as a
fixed unit of analysis and recognising networks as inherently dynamic.
Our conceptual understanding is based on a recognition of the inherent
mutability of networks of actors, while also accounting for those aspects
(e.g. socio-economic and techno-political structures, infrastructural and
other ‘lock-ins,’ and inertia) of energy landscapes that are part of re-
sistors to change.
Analysis is based on research with multiple actors, including na-
tional, provincial and municipal government, activists, energy compa-
nies, NGOs, civil society organisations, and researchers. Our metho-
dology is based on discourse analysis of 42 interviews conducted in
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2017–18; analysis of policy documents as well as reports from gov-
ernmental agencies; and participant observation and observer partici-
pation at four energy policy workshops, two held in Johannesburg and
Polokwane in 2017 and two held in Cape Town in 2018. Interviews
ground a multiscalar analysis in the context of one metropolitan city
(Johannesburg) and one secondary city (Polokwane), where the mu-
nicipal governments have created institutional structures and planning
processes that address climate change, which engage international
donors, national government and NGO representatives. Workshops
were convened by South African NGO Sustainable Energy Africa (SEA)
and geared toward characterising and addressing mutliscalar govern-
ance of energy and climate change.
2. Networks, translation and energy
Our research draws mainly on the policy applications of ANT, while
also linking this literature with research on socio-technical transitions.
Specifically, we build our analysis on ANT’s understanding of modern
socio-technical realities (e.g. energy geographies) as networked and
unstable, and discursively and materially constructed and performed.
Energy scholars have, over the past decade, integrated the insights
of ANT and other branches of the social sciences into energy systems
and services research. In recent years, scholars utilised ANT to explore
the ways in which dynamic networks of actors form specific societal
trajectories [9], or to explore how barriers to socio-technical system
changes are constructed through networks based on specific processes
of purification and translation. For example, Jolivet and Heiskanen [10]
use an ANT framework to show how controversies around wind power
development can be interpreted as attempts to reframe energy projects.
Additionally, they highlight how energy development projects need to
be seen as the result of interactions between globally circulating tech-
nologies, the specificities of local energy sites, and social and political
processes [10,11].
Central to an ANT-enabled analysis is the notion that issues are
understood, presented and challenged according to the twin processes
of purification and translation [12,13]. Purification effectively sepa-
rates knowledge into specific ontological zones [14], such as ‘nature’ or
‘culture’. A simple example of this division is a renewable energy such
as wind power. While the socio-technical and infrastructural system of
wind power generation and distribution can be seen as purified into the
cultural sphere, the element of wind is most often treated as part of the
natural sphere. At the same time, the politics of renewable energy mean
that wind power landscapes are often purified into ‘nature’ (especially
in cases where opponents of wind power construct it as destroying
‘pristine’ natural landscapes), or as parts of a rationalised techno-cul-
tural landscape, ‘beautiful symbols of modern dynamism’ ([10], p.
6750).
Our paper focuses on the concept of translation. In ANT, translation
refers to the discursive, technical, scientific and political mechanisms
through which issues from different ontological zones can be mixed
together. The hybrids that are produced as a result of this ongoing
process can take on the function of aligning interests, priorities, and
strategic imperatives that previously existed in separate form [15].
Thus, ANT challenges the tendency of modernity to purify reality by
focusing on the way(s) in which translation mechanisms produce con-
cepts and ‘things’ that can be seen in the process of translation, thus not
belonging to either ontological zone. Indeed, when an idea is con-
sidered in the process of translation rather than in purified form, what
becomes visible is the (socio-technical, cultural, and political-eco-
nomic) network that constitutes it. Thus, through translation, ideas gain
acceptance, as discursive mechanisms translate them into concepts that
become widely accepted [16]. At the same time, the process of trans-
lation also involves constituting power relations within a network, in-
cluding defining actors within the network [17], and those who are
allowed to speak on specific issues, and for silent (or silenced) others in
the network.
Translation is relevant to the way policy is framed and implemented
at a variety of scales because through translation, certain ideas are
‘progressively transformed into facts through the enrolment of people
who come to interpret claims and ideas in a way which caters to their
own interests’ ([17], p. 533). Indeed, Monstadt and Schramm ([1], p.
109) define translation as an ‘editing process’ that ‘creates a new reality
in the local context so that the two ends fit each other, and thus a local
version of ideals and models is produced.’ The translation process has
attracted particular interest from energy researchers precisely because
it is a part of ANT that can help analyse processes such as transition,
approaches to risk, energy policies, and other key issues. In their study
of the United Kingdom’s quick transition towards natural gas as the
main fuel for residential central heating in the 1960s and 1970s,
Hanmer and Abram [18] show how translation could be identified as
the key mechanism through which actors’ interests were aligned and
framed, and through which actors were mobilised for an energy tran-
sition.
While our approach is rooted in ANT, we make a contribution by
linking its multiscalar network perspective with research on socio-
technical transitions [19–22] and by linking our framework with work
on energy transitions in an African [23], specifically South African
[24–26], context. We focus on how linking ANT to socio-technical
transitions can help understand the spatial and multi-scalar processes of
translation and change regarding electricity systems specifically, and
socio-technical energy infrastructures generally. We make these con-
nections through the analytical framework developed by Murphy and
Carmody [27] to study Tanzania’s urban transition. Leveraging this
work, multiscalar networks of electricity provision, consumption and
governance appear as socio-technical systems characterised not only by
dynamic actor-networks, but by regimes that are ‘dynamically stable
arrangement[s] of materials, practices, and relations’ creating both a
logic of change and ‘path-dependencies and momentum with regard to
the evolution of sociotechnical systems’ ([27], p. 135). Murphy and
Carmody’s framework emphasises these systems as characterised by
production, consumption and infrastructure regimes. Production re-
gimes determine locally specific value creation and upgrading activities
by service providers. Consumption regimes, whilst overlapping with
production regimes, concern the consumption of commodities (such as
fuels), basic services (such as electricity allowances) and welfare goods.
Lastly, consumption regimes shape and are reshaped by ‘infrastructure
regimes that supply, invest in, distribute, and regulate essential goods
and services’ ([27], p. 135), such as electricity. In turn, two key ele-
ments holding together these dynamic regimes are governance ar-
rangements and the multiscalar relationship between various elements
of socio-technical systems. We argue that it is processes of purification
and, more directly, of translation, which help to produce and reproduce
regimes as ways of making sense of different priorities around elec-
tricity supply, by different actors, at different scales.
In summary, the use of ANT helps understand the ways in which
multiscalar processes of arrangement of energy and electricity systems
in SA are organised through mechanisms of purification and transla-
tion. In addition, a socio-technical transitions perspective adds depth to
the network approach by understanding networks as operationalised
through specific regimes, which in turn impact governance and its
multiscalar expression(s). Furthermore, by drawing on both ap-
proaches, we find common ground in both perspectives’ interest in how
governance is spatially articulated [28], and in how networks are dy-
namic and exhibit permanence at different scales over time [29]. Fi-
nally, by drawing on a transitions perspective informed by ANT and
linking it with the SA multi-scalar energy landscape, the paper con-
tributes a novel approach to the wide range of studies [2,8,25,26] that
have thus far explored the SA energy landscape and its potential for
transition and change.
In the case of energy transitions in SA, therefore, we argue that ANT
provides useful insights into how any required large-scale and multi-
scale change is ‘not straightforward: it involves adjustments to many
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aspects of a self-reinforcing system, such as cognitive routines, design
criteria, regulations and standards, markets, sunk investments and
competencies’ ([30], p. 6121). In turn, the actors in networks at each
scale coordinate these adjustments: some networks operate at a variety
of scales, and some across scales [31]. As Murdoch and Marsden [32]
argued, networks of political and other actors engaged in processes of
change at different scales often give rise to layered outcomes in terms of
the interaction between structural determination and more specific
contingent contexts as expressed in socio-spatial relations. ANT can be
helpful precisely for the purpose of ‘investigating links between energy
systems and political structures at national scale as well as household
and local levels’ ([18], p. 182). In addition, we consider the interna-
tional scale, where SA national actors (e.g. the government) play a key
role in translating global policy imperatives to municipal and local
scales while making sense of local realities for a global policy audience.
As Siakwah [33] has argued in work that uses ANT to explore conflict
around oil in Ghana, considering the global scale is a useful way of
avoiding ‘methodological nationalism’ ([33], p. 68) when considering
actor networks.
3. Multi-scalar energy governance: The South African context
SA’s energy system is complex, and issues around energy transitions
are present at various levels. In turn, the interplay between the different
scales at which governance takes place and is communicated de-
termines transitional pathways and helps to influence changes at a re-
gime level. The following outlines the governance context within which
energy pathways are being fashioned and inter-scalar processes are
operationalised.
The country’s governance is based on a three-tier system consisting
of national, provincial and local government, and in each a range of
stakeholders are involved. National government creates laws and po-
licies that govern distinct but overlapping aspects of energy govern-
ance, including climate change policies (e.g. The National Climate
Change Response Policy White Paper, 2011), resource planning (The
Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), 2019) and national development plans
(The National Development Plan, 2012). Of crucial importance to un-
derstand the national scale in multi-scalar energy governance in SA is
the role of Eskom, the national electricity utility, and the wider elec-
tricity planning context [34]. Eskom is a state-owned enterprise that
owns and maintains the national grid, manages all imports and exports
of electricity and has a near monopoly over SA’s electricity generation
[35]. Eskom has also historically carried out electricity planning.
Powers for the Department of Energy to conduct an open planning
process for electricity were only established in the Electricity Regula-
tion Act (2006). The country’s first public electricity plan, the In-
tegrated Resource Plan (IRP), 2011, delivered both a new institutional
process and the potential for a fundamental break with the long-
standing coal-dependent electricity system [36]. The plan was the first
integrated and participative strategy for mapping pathways towards
future electricity generation scenarios, and enshrining them into policy
[37]. Regarding transitioning away from coal, the IRP’s 2010–30 sce-
nario projected adding 6.3 GW of coal power capacity, but also 17.8
GW renewable capacity (focused on solar photovoltaics, or PV, con-
centrating solar power, or CSP, and wind), 9.6 GW of nuclear capacity,
and 8.9 GW of capacity from other sources (including imported hydro
power) [38]. However, critics argue that successive iterations of the IRP
have constrained renewable energy growth, assuming significantly
higher costs for wind and solar power than those achieved in recent
auctions. Scholars and others have argued that despite initial gains in
the transparency of energy policy-making, the stalling of recent ver-
sions of the IRP signal a return to highly secretive decision-making
characteristic of energy policy under apartheid [37] that consolidates
energy planning as a national competency and privileges fossil fuel
incumbents including Eskom [38–41].
SA’s nine provinces are limited in power by their reliance on
national government for financial transfers to implement policies.
Although overarching legislative powers reside with the national gov-
ernment, the objectives and developmental duties of local governments
are set out in the Constitution. These include access to services for all,
prioritising the poor and socio-economic development. Local govern-
ments play a crucial role in delivering energy services and have a range
of local-level policies focused on energy and climate change. This role
includes maintaining the infrastructure, connecting new customers, and
setting pricing and subsidy levels for low-income consumers [42].
Electricity distribution is one of the key roles of SA’s municipalities.
While Eskom is responsible for 60% of electricity distribution, muni-
cipalities are responsible for the remaining 40%. Importantly, the rev-
enue that municipalities gain from their electricity sales is used to cross-
subsidise the provision of other basic services, as well as connections for
low-income households [43,44]. Until recently, the municipal level had
been largely overlooked in policy analyses of SA’s electricity sector.
This has changed in recent years with the political significance of cli-
mate change, frustrated electricity sector reform, and an electricity
supply crisis, which have spurred large urban municipalities to reassert
and expand their role in energy governance, creating tensions in multi-
scalar governance.
While broader structural and political issues are key to how energy
policy is translated across a range of scales including the national and
municipal scales, it is at the community and household levels that the
negative consequences of the current energy supply and distribution
system are most keenly felt. SA faces significant, continuing energy
access challenges: 47% of the population is energy poor [36]. Although
most SA households are connected to electricity, many still lack access
to electricity or clean cooking fuels. Following the democratic transi-
tion, the Integrated National Electrification Programme (INEP) saw a
dramatic rise in domestic connection rates with 87% of households
connected to the grid by 2012 [45]. This success was assisted by surplus
generation capacity and low electricity prices. As many households
cannot afford to use the electricity to which they are connected, despite
a basic allocation of free electricity, access to electricity is not reflected
in electrification rates and millions of low-income households remain
dependent on energy sources such as paraffin, wood and coal. This
leads to problems such as air pollution, respiratory illness and shack
fires [46]. Furthermore, by the early 2000s, progress in the national
electrification programme had slowed, partly due to issues such as the
additional infrastructure required to connect sparsely populated rural
areas [47], the growth of informal settlements. Additionally, the le-
gacies of 1948–94 apartheid era planning inhibited electrification:
Black, Indian and Coloured populations were segregated into townships
and informal settlements (Group Areas Act of 1950), which were
usually located on city outskirts with poor public transport connections
and minimal public services. Planners were involved in the siting and
layout of these informal settlements. Electricity was mainly supplied to
the White population only, which left other, segregated, populations
living in non-serviced townships and informal settlements. The apart-
heid regime left a substantial proportion of the population without
electricity, and post-1994 development and planning policy has tended
to reinforce apartheid-era spatial patterns.
4. Translating energy policy in a multiscalar context
As described, we focus is on how translation occurs in a context
involving multiple scales of governance. We aim to trace how dis-
courses around priorities at different scales are modified so as to make
sense to specific networks of actors operating at the same or different
scales. For example, at the national scale, governments seek to pursue
energy policies that speak to global audiences while translating global
imperatives for city governments and state and municipal authorities.
These same city authorities and government departments are then the
interface between communities, households, and the national and in-
ternational policymaking dimension. Thus, the energy policies with
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which municipalities are concerned may be directly linked, through
national government, to global priorities, but the way(s) in which they
are debated and presented differs because translation of policy discourse
and imperatives becomes necessary by different scalar actors. In fo-
cusing on translation across scales and through networks of actors, we
draw on long-standing calls from scholars for research that is both
sensitive to scale and for work that avoids adopting a single institu-
tional or organizational analytical focus [48]. The paper focuses on a
broad network of scalar governance that impacts the energy landscape
and its materialities at the local scale, stressing that the configuration of
scales of governance should not be seen as a strict top-down hierarchy,
but as a dynamic power geometry [49,50]. Indeed, the scales of gov-
ernance outlined below do not necessarily interact in a linear fashion:
specific cities, for example, can be seen as crucial actors when reporting
for sub-national climate actions is involved: this reporting, in turn, is
crucial to national performance seeking climate finance from the in-
ternational community [51].
We highlight various scales of governance while focusing more
specifically on what we consider to be oft-ignored scalar realities in
sustainable urban development: the community and household scales.
This focus aims to conceptually hold together different scales and
governance processes that can be described as a network. Following
Dicken et al. ([48], p. 91), we understand networks as ‘essentially re-
lational processes, which when realised empirically within distinct time-
and space-specific contexts, produce observable patterns in the global
economy.’ We argue that the patterns produced by actor-networks at
the municipal, community and household scales are visible throughout
SA’s national energy landscape, especially when considering specific
configurations that lead to energy inequalities in the context of housing
informality. Thus, the analysis below includes a focus on the household
and community scales, while situating these within broader relational
networks of actors and processes across and within other scales of
governance. Focusing on household and community scales can imply
potential biases of speaking to broader processes from the starting point
(s) of specific geographical and actor contexts [48], but it is in the
household context that SA’s so-called ‘energy underclass’ ([2], p. 1) is
expressed in individual biographies [52–54]. Thus, how these scalar
actors are enrolled in and shape transition pathways is important em-
pirically, conceptually and in policy practice.
First, much of the work on the household scale and environmental
governance (see, for example, [55–57]) has been in developed contexts
characterised by techno-economic interventions into cities where basic
material needs are largely met. Similarly, analysis of the potential for
urban experimentation to identify practices for sustainable urban de-
velopment [58,59] has tended to ignore Global South urban contexts.
There is much scope for widening this research agenda [60]. Second,
equity and justice can be served by inclusive planning, multi-institu-
tional network-building, and multi-scalar translation of policy and
community-based adaptation strategies [61,62]. This body of research
underlines the key importance of the community level, and we extend
this consideration by arguing that the household scale should also
benefit from research emphasis. From an ANT perspective, the key
question is to what extent planning for inclusive transitional pathways
manages to enrol a diverse range of actors (including local and com-
monly excluded actors). Third, we argue that a focus on community and
household scales is key in that it helps to move towards the right to the
city [63] in a local context where rights may be enshrined in law but are
bypassed in practice. Thus, a focus on community and household scales
can be part of a process of opening up the right to the city and to full
citizenship [64]. By citizenship, we signify not only the rights and
duties of current citizens [65], but the situations of individuals who
aspire to gain SA nationality [66,67]. Finally, this approach helps to
spatialise discussions – on topics such as the circulation of global energy
and sustainable development policy [68], transnational climate gov-
ernance and adaptation [69], energy and cities in the Global South [70]
– that often focus on the national and supra-national scales. A focus on
communities and households necessitates, by definition, grounded en-
gagement with the places and people impacted by processes of energy
provision (or lack thereof).
5. Multiscalar perspectives and energy policy
Our research highlights processes of translation of priorities related
to energy policy that are articulated across a range of scales. In turn,
actor-networks with differing levels of agency at different scales per-
form the SA energy policy and practice landscape, at a specific scalar
level (such as the national policy landscape) as well as framing and
communicating energy issues and trajectories to actors at different
scalar levels. In the following discussion, we highlight this process of
translation of different imperatives within and across scales and by
different actors: this shows how energy governance is affected by
translation of policy and practice through different scales of govern-
ance. While context is key, our focus is on how translation works, and is
expressed, by different actors at different scales. In addition, we aim to
show the implicit constraints within scalar energy governance, as spe-
cific priorities at one scalar level are changed or at times subsumed into
more diffuse or different narratives depending on the type of framing
used.
5.1. The global scale
At the global scale, SA national energy and development priorities
interface with the circulation of policy discourses and priorities such as
UN climate change agreements, requirements for accessing climate fi-
nance, and in international action on emissions, green growth and other
issues. Like other states, SA has been involved in international climate
and sustainable development negotiations, including the 1992 United
Nations Framework for the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Climate Agreement. SA’s international
commitments are tempered by recognition that ‘any policy-driven
transition to a low carbon and climate resilient society must take into
account its overriding priority to address poverty and inequality’ ([71],
p. 2). Previously, SA’s emissions reduction commitments at the 2009
Copenhagen Climate Summit had demonstrated a gap between national
government and the corporate and local scales. President Zuma framed
South Africa’s emissions target as an emissions intensity target, gaining
international praise without committing to a target for absolute emis-
sions. Nonetheless, the proposed action was also described as being
‘totally at variance with what is taking place in SA on the ground as
regards energy and it disregards the country’s lack of ability to imple-
ment the curbs without damaging the economy, especially given its
reliance on coal fired power’ ([72], p. 6). Even at the scale of supra-
national environmental discourse, clear constraints exist when globa-
lised discourse(s) are communicated to national-scale actors who, while
needing to communicate with international policymakers, are also
aware of local contexts of energy poverty and inequality, uneven eco-
nomic development, and structural constraints.
A set of transnational ideas are also translated into local social and
sectoral context by municipalities and NGOs. Policy experiments with
universal basic income in European countries have provided inspiration
for innovation in municipal energy policy in Cape Town. A municipal
team responsible for low income energy services proposed that re-
imagining electricity supply as a variant on basic income might lever
wider political support to increase subsidies for residential electricity
use:
“Electricity is extremely versatile – it’s the next best thing to money.
You can do so many things with electricity… Universal basic income
has had a radical impact on poverty elsewhere. Electricity is the next
best thing, and the City has total control over it – it’s something that
we can provide.
The proposal emphasised benefits that could enrol other municipal
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and national actors, including positive effects on health (by displacing
unsafe cooking fuels), nutrition (by enabling electric cooking at home),
and connectivity (enabling social inclusion through television and in-
ternet access). They emphasised that affordable access would deter
electricity theft that contributes to municipal debt, and expressed
Keynesian ideas that affordable access would increase consumer de-
mand, serving the local and national economy:
“We’re giving the wrong message to poor households – saying ‘save
electricity’; they’re not even vaguely using enough… And no-one
can object on the basis that the poor will waste it”
“And so this is about the total finance system in the City and in the
country. So how do we make it make sense that we pay for this?”
The proposal was accompanied by quantification of an estimated
reduction in the city’s Gini coefficient, a statistical measure of in-
equality with the power to name Cape Town among the most unequal
cities in the world and to draw international attention to failures in
addressing the structural legacies of apartheid.
Global or transnational ideas are also translated as they are localised
by advocacy groups. A South African NGO described how their efforts
to frame a campaign for localised control of the energy system en-
countered confusion locally. Inspired by food sovereignty movements in
Latin America, the NGO had convened workshops on ‘energy sover-
eignty’ to emphasise community control over how energy is produced,
traded and consumed. Yet, they found that sovereignty was too closely
associated with the state in a South African context and had little
traction with grassroots activists, while ‘energy democracy’ held more
positive connotations. Similarly, various civil society forums on energy
transition adopted the language of ‘Just Transitions’, where the demo-
cratic transition is recognised to have left racial and socio-economic
injustices unaddressed, and where the question of ‘what to do about
coal jobs’ frames discussion about decarbonisation and the prospect
that labour unions might provide meaningful support for social move-
ments on climate change.
5.2. The national scale
At the level of national government, energy is an issue that becomes
translated in multiple ways depending on whether dialogue is taking
place within national government, with international institutions and
other governments, or with municipalities. Simultaneously, energy
discourse(s) at this scale are complex assemblages made up not only of
dynamic actor-networks, but of narratives and policy agendas that can
be disaggregated by different types of energy. For example, household
energy is generally segmented into its purposive use (for lighting,
cooking, heating and sometimes transport).
Discursive work with international actors necessitates the transla-
tion of national imperatives (for example, eliminating energy poverty
and other forms of poverty) into action on global concerns, usually
climate change. When the national scale interacts with municipalities,
on the other hand, what is brought to bear is less the international
climate change imperative and more the need to fulfil constitutional
commitments to end poverty and enable energy access for all, and the
implementation of national energy policy. At the same time, the na-
tional scale is where specific network tensions are expressed. A key
example is the scalar tension in electricity distribution, between local
municipalities as and Eskom as a vertically integrated company. In
Johannesburg both distribute electricity to different supply areas,
which derive their form from apartheid era spatial planning and sub-
sequent institutional reform. Crucially, the municipal distributor, City
Power, must extract a surplus from their customers to fund municipal
budgets, but Eskom does not. As a municipal energy manager in
Johannesburg explains, this scalar disjuncture in electricity governance
creates inequalities for residents and businesses:
‘Sandton and Soweto [in Johannesburg] are supplied by Eskom and
the rest of City of Joburg is City Power. […] So ironically, somebody
in a low-income area in Joburg is cross-subsidising someone from a
low-income area in Sandton or Soweto. Net result? Electricity in a
municipal area is not as affordable as in an Eskom area.’
However, there is also an element of purification: of issues as they
pertain to diverse audiences, and at different scales. The common de-
nominator (electricity) becomes purified into an economically proble-
matic, poverty-facing ontological zone (symbolised by Eskom supply),
and contrasted with a more stable, legitimised zone (municipal energy
supply). Thus, the interaction between the national and international
scales tends to purify the issue of energy poverty into one of climate
change adaptation and mitigation, and into one of binary actors dis-
tributing energy to the poor.
An example of the above dynamic can be seen in SA’s 2017 Climate
Change Adaptation Strategy, authored by the Department for
Environmental Affairs [73]. The strategy clearly maps the international
landscape around climate change adaptation and mitigation, and points
to the opportunities for support and monitoring available through in-
ternational arrangements. At the same time, when considering the sub-
national scale at the level of municipalities, the strategy highlights how
‘climate change response capacity is extremely limited in the provincial
sphere of government’ ([73], p. 40), an ironic point when considering
that provincial government relies on national government financial
transfers to implement these policy goals. Nonetheless, in a discursive
move back to the national scale, having established the limitations that
exist at the level of municipalities, the strategy then places the emphasis
back on the local scale by stating that: ‘The broader mandate for local
government to respond to climate change is rooted in SA’s Constitution,
because many critical actions required for climate change responses fall
within the responsibility of local government’ ([73], p. 82).
The example of SA’s Climate Change Adaptation Strategy shows
how national government is situated at the interface between national
priorities around equity and energy, and international discourses on
global issues such as climate change. At the same time, the strategy
highlights the translational issues in transforming climate change ac-
tion into local priorities, and the scalar complexities involved. These
translational complexities can, in turn, be felt as a disjuncture in
translation between the national and local scales of governance. A
Johannesburg-based activist provides a critical self-reflection on the
extent to which climate campaigners have managed to translate climate
change into something that resonates with immediate social and en-
vironmental concerns that evoke popular discontent:
‘[W]e have not connected issues like climate change to everyday
struggles … On the ground, there isn’t an environmental justice
movement, a connection between things happening in different
places. And the service delivery strikes – the protests – are more
complex than simply environmental justice.’
What is key is the notion of distance between local priorities and
national agenda items such as climate change. The quote evidences a
purification of issues into different ontological zones: in this case, into a
global and long-term zone (climate change), and a local and everyday
zone (energy poverty). This particular distinction is also an example of
purification of specific issues into different scalar and temporal zones.
However, the core of the activist’s argument is a desire to see a trans-
lation of these issues from the global and local zones, to be considered at
a point of hybridity where the two become intertwined.
5.3. The municipal scale
The issue of municipal financing also highlights the translational
difficulties between national policy and local contexts. At a workshop
on climate finance for municipal government, a consultant who had
advised National Treasury on mainstreaming climate change into mu-
nicipal planning reflected that the Treasury is insistent that
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municipalities look to the international scale to fund infrastructure for
climate adaptation:
‘There are real limits to what can be done by maximising the in-
tergovernmental grant system. National Treasury want local gov-
ernment to be more financially resilient, so they need to be using
their own sources of funding… So then you have to start thinking
about accessing the Global Climate Fund. Kigali has got it, so why
haven’t South African cities?’
Municipalities often cite the Municipal Finance Management Act as
a barrier to effective climate action, since it limits the temporal and
scalar power of municipalities in borrowing, procurement, and long
term planning that they may need to raise capital from international
markets or meet the high capital expenditure of actions that offer
transformational change. Consultants that drafted a discussion paper
for the workshop suggested that municipalities might exercise some
agency within the constraints imposed by the law by interpreting it
differently:
‘…often institutionalised interpretations of the provisions are not
the only way to interpret the Act within legal bounds.
Reinterpretation is very important, as an overhaul of the regulatory
framework is not well supported [by national institutions].’
During the same workshop, municipal representatives spoke of the
challenges and contradictions of translating local government into the
programmatic climate action that is legible for climate finance mon-
itoring and verification, while simultaneously speaking to national
priorities on competitiveness, inequality and unemployment:
‘We’re always under pressure to create jobs. But to make the argu-
ment is very difficult. It’s empty in some ways. We can try to show
how money can circulate in the local economy, so the city is not
throwing money outside the city… I can directly argue for that. But
for the jobs stuff, I make it up as I go along.’
Similarly, there is recognition that smaller municipalities may have
to combine actions and increasing coordination, possibly creating spe-
cial purpose vehicles (SPVs) for infrastructure investment in order for
climate action to be legible to investors at national and global scale:
‘There is lots of money sloshing around in South Africa with in-
stitutional investors, but they don’t want to invest it with munici-
palities because they don’t understand them. Pooling Green Bonds
allows you to access them.’
While municipalities are encouraged to translate local priorities into
programmatic climate action that is legible at the global scale, they are
under pressure to ensure that they are delivering services locally and
accountable to residents rather than global institutions. One municipal
employee noted how this dynamic shaped party-political competition
between mayoral candidates in Johannesburg:
‘[Mayor] Parks Tau was accused by some of promoting vanity pro-
jects at home… and for self-aggrandising on the international stage
with the Ecomobilities event … The current mayor says he has no
interest in UN-Habitat or those international city networks. He says
he’s more focused on service delivery.’
Yet, the same interviewee notes how party-political change and
even municipal strategy may be partially isolated from how the city’s
bureaucracy operates in practice:
‘For all the struggle over changing the strategy documents when the
DA [Democratic Alliance] came in – like changing the IDP
[Integrated Development Plan], or discussions around ditching the
Corridors of Freedom – I still know what I have got to do. I delib-
erately did not attend those meetings about strategy’
Where intergovernmental transfers are restricted and accessing cli-
mate finance is onerous, South Africa’s largest city municipalities have
sought debt finance through Green Bonds. The City of Johannesburg’s
first Green Bond was oversubscribed; it was considered as a possible
model for financing the City’s own investments in renewable energy
generation that could directly challenge’s Eskom power as the single
buyer of electricity from independent power producers. In Cape Town,
one municipal manager cited problems with the city’s own bond: ‘Green
Bonds are very effective in raising money, but it’s expensive money
because it’s refinancing existing projects’.
5.4. The community scale
At the community scale, the complexity of actor-networks involved
in SA energy generation, distribution and consumption is evident. The
community scale is where national authorities act, sometimes directly
or through local intermediaries, while being the interface where
households and community organisations interact with different mu-
nicipal government departments. At community level, for example,
Ziervogel et al. [74] have shown how flood risk affecting informal
settlements in Cape Town can best be understood through the study of
‘nodes’ of governance in local government. These ‘nodes’ are the dif-
ferent departments, and their differing ‘mentalities’, within a single
local government authority. Ziervogel et al. [74] underline how un-
packing the way(s) in which governance plays out through these at
times siloed nodes, and then at the community level, is key to under-
standing both how approaches to specific issues (such as energy access)
are influenced by different mentalities and technologies enshrined in
different government departments, and how obstacles to resolving in-
grained problems (such as equitable and affordable energy access) can
be tackled through a reconfiguration of these nodes. At the same time, it
is clear that (as with other multiscalar interactions) links between
communities and other scales of governance are effected through
complex translation arrangements. The complexities of translation be-
tween various scales of governance are evident in the growth of power
generation by residents and businesses, and how it contrasts with ex-
isting energy governance. These complexities are reflected in the fol-
lowing quote by a representative of the local government association,
SALGA:
‘In the city we see a lot of contribution [to electricity generation]
from the customers… We see a lot of private investors in the local
government space… And at national level, it’s still vertical in-
tegration, centralised planning, big infrastructure. It’s going to in-
crease the electricity price and it’s unclear if we need it at this time.’
The same interviewee further explained how the local, municipal
level had, in their view, been somewhat illegible from the national scale
in terms of translation of national imperatives to the municipal scale,
and the community scale to the national:
‘[N]ational planning looked at local government as a black box in
their planning and didn’t take into account the dynamics, and the
developments that are happening and there’s a lot happening.’
This insight is evidenced in debates around municipal production of
energy. Utility-scale IPPs of electricity from renewable energy and coal
were recently introduced following the launch of the country’s REIPPPP
and a subsequent programme to procure electricity from IPPs of coal
[75,76]. Since the start of the programme in 2011 and until the time of
writing in 2019, REIPPPP procured approximately 6,422 MW capacity
from 92 large independent power producer (“IPPs”) and 99 MW ca-
pacity from 20 small scale (1–5 MW capacity) IPPs. A subsequent
programme for the procurement of privately generated coal-fired power
was introduced in 2015 [41].
However, some factions of government and some trade unions see
the introduction of renewable electricity generation as a direct chal-
lenge to the monopoly control of Eskom, and to employment in coal
mining and coal-fired power plants. Eskom has been structured around
its dependence on ‘big coal, big nuclear, big networks’ ([77], p. 1) and
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continues to rely on mega-projects, most recently the coal-fired power
plants Medupi and Kusile, currently under construction. The utility has
long been resistant to the diversification of its sources of electricity
generation as well as attempts to liberalise it in line with international
trends in power sector reform, both of which would pose a challenge to
its monopoly control. In February 2019, it was announced that Eskom
would finally be split into three separate companies under Eskom
Holdings, for generation, transmission and distribution with each entity
having its own balance sheet. This would see the single biggest eco-
nomic reform since the democratic government restructured public fi-
nances in the late 1990s.
Those at the community scale question why Eskom cannot be re-
conceptualised as a national entity that can be charged with energy
diversification and with more local provision. As a union worker in
Johannesburg stated regarding the argument that Eskom’s power plants
closure was due to IPPs:
‘On the recent announcement of the closure of coal plants… There’s
a contradiction. The reason Eskom has given for closing them is the
IPPs. The main problem is surplus caused by the IPPs. Eskom re-
sisted signing off on new IPPs over the last year and the government
forced them to.’
The quote highlights a tension between national-scale actors
(Eskom, the national government) and municipal-scale stakeholders. At
the same time, the same interviewee highlighted how this issue, being
debated at national level, was of key concern at the community scale
because of local economic realities involving the current energy system:
‘With closures, communities will collapse, [towns] will become
ghost towns, dependent on the power stations. [T]here should be no
power station closures. And we’ve combined with Eskom to discuss
with government. We support renewables, but we don’t support
IPPs. We don’t understand why Eskom can’t participate in the re-
newables. If it was a publicly owned and socially owned entity for
renewable energy then [the union] would support it. There is no
effort to maximise job creation.’
Divesting from coal has become a strongly politicised (and racia-
lised) issue due to the coal industry providing significant employment,
and union resistance to divestment. Coal accounts for c.72% of SA’s
primary energy, and the energy sector is responsible for the majority of
SA’s GHG emissions [78]. This constitutes a significant transitional
challenge in light of policy aims to move towards a sustainable, low-
carbon economy. Decentralisation and the diverse realities of different
municipalities and their energy needs were also issues that highlighted
the disjuncture between national-scale planning for energy distribution
and local realities, according to the same SALGA interviewee as quoted
above:
‘[D]emand in the city is going to grow, and it’s needed for services
and everything but the way we meet those needs will be very dif-
ferent. Not only electricity from national grid but also energy that is
locally produced. Also there will be other sources, mainly gas. And
that’s where the national planning isn’t looking at those dynamics.’
In addition, decentralisation of electricity generation and the po-
tential of small scale generation through technologies such as PV were
seen in part as holding great potential precisely because of the promise
to, on the one hand, overcome obstacles such as legal and economic
difficulties in electrifying informal settlements and, on the other, pro-
vide technological solutions that are local and seemingly not as de-
pendent on municipal or national scales of governance for their roll-out
or operation. One such project involves installing household solar PV
systems in an informal settlement in Stellenbosch. The managers em-
phasised that a critical factor in the initial success of the project was
assuring residents that a solar home system would not undermine re-
cognition of tenure or delay the extension of grid supply to their homes,
but that solar would only be a temporary solution, ‘while you wait’ for
the grid. Other approaches raise similarly contentions, such as those
under consideration in Johannesburg, described by a municipal em-
ployee:
‘projects such as a solar facility in informal settlements, perhaps on a
shipping container where people can come and charge their phones,
or which connects to 10 or 20 households. Something that is self-
contained, not drawing on the grid, which can be managed by the
community themselves, to own and maintain it, not the City. Like an
independent microgrid. We don’t want them touching the formal
grid, because it’s still a strain on the formal grid. It’s all very well to
say connect those people, but they are still drawing legally and il-
legally from the formal grid. It needs to be off-grid, completely, self-
sufficient, self-contained, managed by the community.
The above quote clearly points to the complex controversies sur-
rounding the issues of connecting informal settlements to a universal
grid network or, alternatively, supporting (or allowing for) private
sector actors in developing non-grid-connected systems for the provi-
sion of electricity. Additionally, these difficulties present a spatialised
transitional challenge. These types of controversies herald potential
scenarios where specific areas of the country become enrolled in tran-
sition towards future energy scenarios, while leaving other areas and
societal groups behind.
6. Discussion and conclusion
It is clear, from the above analysis, that SA’s energy policy and
practice landscape is highly complex and dynamic. At the same time, it
is sometimes discussed as rigid and locked into a system of national
energy service and infrastructure provision that seems monolithic and
largely inefficient. The dynamic nature of the country’s energy land-
scape is seen when a conceptual lens informed by ANT is deployed.
What comes into focus is a shifting pattern of agency, power, and actor-
networks active at different scales, from the resident of an informal
settlement reliant on burning fuel all the way to the global policy-
making arena where energy is translated into a sphere of action for
meeting emissions and other sustainability targets in light of the climate
change imperative. Rather than reifying different scales of energy
governance and presenting them as fixed and determined, a focus on
translation shows how discourses are mobilised, framed, changed,
sometimes dissipated, and communicated at and between different
scales. In turn, this insight is key to understanding the mechanisms
through which energy priorities, by different assemblages of actors, can
be enrolled into trajectories of transition towards more equitable, just
and sustainable energy landscapes [79]. The paper has argued that
combining insights from ANT and studies of transitions contributes to
energy research through this highlighting of mechanisms of translation
that are key to envisioning and enabling transitional pathways. Indeed,
it could be argued that identifying translational processes, as well as
obstacles to translation (such as the siloisation and single-department
focus outlined above), is a key initial condition to the elaboration and
eventual operationalisation of energy transitions.
In addition to the reflections and analysis above, it is also clear that,
in terms of multiscalar energy governance, the (poorest) household and
community scales seem to be under-considered and under-represented
in the SA context. The neglect of the community scale is unsurprising in
the broader context of widespread and marked inequalities across dif-
ferent aspects of environmental, political, infrastructural and other
spheres of life in SA [80]. Nonetheless, from an ANT perspective, the
permanence of energy inequalities affecting large swathes of poor or
informal households unmasks the fact that the issue of equitable energy
access in SA is, at its very heart, controversial, where ‘controversial’ is
understood, from an ANT viewpoint, as a state of socio-technical
complexity [81]. This can be seen by the fact that, although actor-
networks at all scales easily agree on the priority of energy access for all
and of climate change mitigation, when the complexity of energy, access
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issues, and multi-scalar governance are taken into account, the issue
becomes controversial. It is at this point that the household and com-
munity scales become key for researchers and policymakers. We argue
that this risks eliminating households and local communities from the
discourses of power that enable different energy scenarios and that
determine transitional pathways. This exclusion is because con-
troversies, such as those around how to deliver equitable energy access
to SA’s poorest, are at their essence ‘struggles to conserve or reverse
social inequalities’ ([81], p. 262). At the same time, our research clearly
points to the key role that municipal actors can play in communicating
and putting into action specific transitional pathways. Municipalities
are also situated in parts of the network that interface particularly
closely with the community and household scale, and municipal actors
can have the agency of potentially speaking for communities and
households, or of functioning to effectively silence their voices because
of specific interpretation of municipalities’ role as network spokes-
persons.
With regards to clean energy transitions, our paper points to the
potential for enrolment of communities and households in the poorest
areas of SA’s cities in managed transitional pathways. While enrolment
into a network focused on transition can occur in ways that treat the
poor as voiceless actors and makes assumptions about their priorities, it
can also happen in more progressive, communicative ways as a result of
processes that focus on intermediated engagement between actors in
different parts of the transitional network, and in ways that render
explicit (and perhaps open to contestation) the power relations that are
bound to exist in such processes. What might this mean for SA’s poorest
urban communities? A range of policy directions could be imagined,
from the formation of off-grid, but serviced, settlements with a clear
interim mandate, to the recognition of settlements’ settled status
through a translational mechanism whereby communities, munici-
palities, government departments and the private sector work to es-
tablish context-sensitive pathways in situ with communities. This would
not only help to move towards equitably enrolling communities and
households into transitional pathways, but would also help to continue
recognising, establishing and respecting household and community
status in broader planning trajectories.
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